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Between Juvenile and Adult Courts: 
A No Man's Land for the Youthful 
Offender 
by Nancy L. Iredale and Paul L. Joffe 
Miss Iredale and Mr. Joffe are both students at Yale 
Law School. 
This paper was originally prepared under the auspices 
of Yale Legislative Services, a student organization at the 
Yale Law School, for use by the Connecticut General 
Assembly in its consideration of the problem of whether 
cases involving 16 and 17 year old defendants should 
be tried by the juvenile or adult courts. 
In the great majority of states all persons who have 
not reached their 16th birthday are within the original, 
exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. All those 
who have reached their eighteenth birthday are within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the adult criminal courts. It 
is the remaining category-16 and 17 year olds-with 
which this paper is concerned. Most states have some 
provision for transferring 16-or 17 year old defendants 
between juvenile and adult courts. Usually the responsi-
bility for the transfer rests with the juvenile court-a 
youth's case is considered first by a juvenile judge who 
decides whether to transfer it to the adult court. 
Transfer statutes typically require certain basic findings 
by the court, such as the nature of the offense and 
amenability of the accused to rehabilitation. Yet, 
while most codes now require an investigation prior 
to the decision as to transfer, few (with the model 
exception of Texas) indicate what specific criteria are 
to guide the judge in deciding whether to transfer the 
youth. 1 
In the case of Connecticut, which we will discuss in 
detail, the statute provides no guidelines as to the pro-
cedure or criteria for determining whether the case of a 
youth shall be handled in the juvenile court. Where 
criteria (other than age2 ) do exist, they are most often 
based on classes of offenses. Fourteen states and the 
District of Columbia, for example, transfer to the adult 
court only if a felony is alleged. 3 A typical statute is 
that of Tennessee which permits transfer to adult court 
( 1) if the defendant is accused of a felony and there is a 
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finding that he is unamenable to rehabilitation or (2) if 
t~ere is probable cause that the youth is guilty of rape, 
first degree murder or robbery with a deadly weapon. 
Beyond that, the statutes give little direction to the 
courts. Several states require a finding that adjudication 
in a juvenile court would be contrary to the best 
interests of the child or the community.4 Maine allows 
adult court trial when there is probable cause to believe 
that the accused is a menace to the community; Penn-
sylvania has a similarly vague provision. In Alabama, 
trial in the adult court is permitted if a judge is con-
vinced that a juvenile cannot be made to lead a correct 
life; but an appeals court has reversed a transfer in a 
murder case, saying that the Juvenile Court could not 
disregard evidence of seventeen witnesses as to the good 
reputation of the accused. 5 
Texas is one of few states to provide statutory guide-
lines for the court considering transfer. Its law requires 
the judge to consider whether the crime was one against 
the person; whether it was committed aggressively and 
with premeditation; whether there is evidence upon 
which a grand jury may be expected to indict; the soph-
istication and maturity of the accused; his or her record 
and previous history, and the likelihood that the public 
will be protected and the accused rehabilitated by 
juvenile institution methods.6 
Surveys indicate that, in the absence of statutory 
criteria, judges improvise. The response to one such 
survey indicated judicial consideration of the probable 
length of the adjudicatory process, the seriousness of the 
offense and any prior failure by the accused to respond 
to treatment, the "hopelessness" of the case, the attitude 
of the accused and the resources of the correctional 
institutions. Commenting on the results of the survey, 
the Advisory Council of Judges (of the National Council 
on Crime and Delinquency) noted that "all except the 
last of these criteria are in conflict with juvenile court 
philosophy." More recently, a Presidential commission 
found the following to be the most frequently con-
sidered factors: seriousness of the alleged offense; the 
aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner in 
which the offense was committed; the sophistication, 
maturity and emotional attitude of the child; his prior 
record, and the proximity of the juvenile's ar to the 
maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction. 
In its survey of fifty juvenile courts in the late l 950's, 
the National Council on Crime and Delinquency re-
ported that every juvenile court questioned conducts 
some sort of investigation or hearing prior to making a 
decision to transfer. In some states where the statute 
requires a full hearing, the probation officer's investiga-
tion by itself has been ruled an insufficient basis for 
transfer.9 The Standard Juvenile Court Act contem-
plates transfer only on the findings produced by a 
hearing and with a certification by the court that certain 
criteria have been met. 10 
The right to a hearing was raised to quasi-Constitu-
tional status in the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in Kent v. U.S. 11 The Court was con-
struing a District of Columbia statute permitting transfer 
from juvenile to adult court after investigation. Yet the 
Court spoke in broader due process terms, requiring a 
hearing although none was provided for in the statute 
and indicating that the transfer process in any state may 
involve Constitutional questions. In Kent, the Supreme 
Court was concerned with the lack of any genuine 
hearing in the transfer of a 16 year old accused of house-
breaking, robbery and rape. The Court underscored its 
concern with the Constitutional right to due process and 
to counsel in the following passages: 
"lt is clear beyond dispute that the waiver [transfer] of 
jurisdiction is a 'critically important' action determining 
vitally important statutory rights of the juvenile. 
... [T] here is no place in-our system of law for reaching 
a result of such tremendous consequences without 
ceremony-without hearing, without effective assistance 
of counsel, without a statement of reasons. -
... An opportunity for a hearing, which may be in-
formal, must be given the child prior to entry of a 
waiver order. .. Appointment of counsel without 
affording an opportunity for hearing on a 'critically 
important' decision is tantamount to denial of 
counsel." 12 
In addition to requiring a hearing, the Kent case required 
access by defense counsel to the social records presum-
ably considered by the court in making its transfer 
decision and a statement by the court of the reasons for 
its decision with "sufficient specificity to permit 
meaningful review." 13 The case, however, did not reach 
the question of what criteria should be the basis for 
waiver of jurisdiction.14 
Transfers in Connecticut 
In the State of Connecticut, 16 or I 7 year olds 
accused of crimes are not brought first to the juvenile 
court. With the exception of those who are arraigned 
pursuant to a bench warrant by the Superior Court, 
youthful accused are always brought first to the Circuit 
Court. Connecticut General Statute 54-1 a authorizes the 
Circuit Court to transfer 16 and 1-7 year old offenders to 
the Juvenile Court at the discretion of the Circuit Court 
judge. If the accused has no previous juvenile or criminal 
court record, the Juvenile Court must accept his case 
when referred by the Circuit Court. If, however, the 
accused has previously been convicted of a crime or been 
adjudged delinquent, the Juvenile Court has the option 
of refusing jurisdiction. 15 The current statute provides 
no guidelines for determining whether a youth shall be 
transferred to the Juvenile Collrt. 
A prime consequence of the broad mandate of the 
transfer statute is wide variation in the transfer pro-
cedures followed by Circuit Courts throughout the State 
of Connecticut. For example, with respect to the motion 
to transfer one Circuit Court judge asserted that he will 
consider transferring a case to the Juvenile Court only 
upon motion by the prosecution or by defense counsel. 
Another judge stated that he has set in motion the trans-
fer mechanism on his own initiative in order to "avoid 
the stigma of a criminal record" for the offender. 
A further consequence of the nonspecificity of the 
transfer statute is that there may or may not be an effort 
to investigate the social history of the youth to discover 
whether he will be amenable to rehabilitation by the 2
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juvenile system. There is no such requirement in the 
statute and thus the practice varies from court to court. 
An investigation may be undertaken by the Family 
Relations Board of the Circuit Court. One prosecutor 
informed us that he himself often handles this matter. 
Such an investigation may entail conversations with 
parent and child and an inquiry into previous juvenile or 
adult court records. Investigation may be initiated by 
the prosecutor before the case comes before the judge; it 
may be requested by the judge, or it may not be under-
taken at all, since the court is empowered to make the 
transfer decision without it. Our impression from talking 
to lawyers is that as often as not there will be no investi-
gation at all. 
As with the other aspects of the transfer procedure, 
the grounds for the decision to transfer a case to juvenile 
authorities vary throughout the state. One prosecutor 
commented that he virtually never opposes a motion to 
transfer an accused who has no prior record. He indi-
cated that until recently judges transferred first 
offenders almost automatically. He suggested that judges 
are currently being more discriminating and are making 
an effort to exercise the broad discretion which the 
statute grants them. This prosecutor felt however that 
judges usually followed his recommenda~ions as t~ trans-
fer. c.on~ersations with circuit judges throughout the 
state 1nd1cated that most of them base their transfer 
decisions on the seriousness of the offense and their 
assessment of the defendant's chances for rehabilitation. 
Judges considered narcotics cases to be too serious to 
transfer; indeed they generally expressed reluctance to 
transfer any felony, espeCially those such as mugging or 
robbery which involve violence. At the other end of the 
behavioral spectrum, judges generally did not consider 
traffic violations to be serious enough to warrant in-
voking the transfer mechanism. One judge expressed 
reluctance to transfer any case to the Juvenile Court 
stating that in his experience nine out of 1 O cases we're 
so-called "companion cases" in which at least one of the 
parties involved was over 18 and he considered it unfair 
to handle the offenders-who presumably were equally 
culpable-on a different basis solely because of a slight 
age difference. The prior record of the accused the 
chances for supervision at home and parental a~titudes 
were other factors mentioned as affecting the likelihood 
of transfer. 
The. pattern of transfers is also strongly affected by 
the attitude of the Juvenile Courts. First offenders trans-
ferred by the. Circuit Court must by statute be accepted 
by the Juvemle Court. One probation officer informed 
us of a recent case involving a first offender charged with 
armed robbery with violence, which was transferred 
against his recommendation. As to second offenders 
h~wever, the Juvenile Court has statutory discretion' to 
re1ect a transfer. At least two Juvenile Courts seem to 
reject the recidivist automatically and without a 
hearing. 16 In weighing whether to accept the transfer of 
a second offender, the following considerations, noted in 
a statement by a Juvenile Court judge, may be involved: 
"In determining whether to refuse jurisdiction of second 
offenders referred to us from Circuit Court, we take into 
consideration the nature of the offense for which the 
child was adjudicated and his response to any attempt 
by the court through probation or otherwise to change 
his behavior in the past. We may also take into account 
the length of time elapsing between the adjudication and 
his present involvement and the type of record he has 
made for himself in the interim .... We try to look at all 
the factors which would indicate whether or not proba-
tion would be successful." 
Yet, there seems to be a strong tendency toward au to-
matic rejection of the second offender. The same judge 
said: 
... [Fl or the most part we would refuse second 
offenders simply because of the volume of first offenders 
referred to us [from the Circuit Courts] , which is well 
over twenty per cent of all referrals [from adult courts]. 
We feel that our efforts with the 16 to 18 year olds take 
time away from those under whom we feel we have 
more chance of helping. 
One probation officer explained that the reasoning be-
hind rejecting most second offenders is that the youthful 
offender should be granted one chance to benefit from 
the Juvenile Court system; if he does not reform, he 
must be prepared to face normal criminal sanctions on 
succeeding offenses. The probation officer also noted 
the crowded docket of the Juvenile Court as a reason for 
automatically rejecting "repeaters." He said that excep-
tions are made in such cases only if a probation officer 
has special reason to believe that the accused will be 
amenable to probation, or if the defense counsel gives 
some special reason why the accused should not have to 
face criminal punishment (imminent enlistment in the 
army was cited as one such reason). 
It would be most interesting to be able to compare 
the disposition of those in the 16 and 17 year old group 
who are transferred with disposition of those who are 
not. Unfortunately, statistics are not available at pre-
sent.17 We include the following information, however, 
to give the best available picture of the results of the 
transfer process. The statistics which are available con-
firm our information that most transfers involve minor 
offenses, and that, overall, the percentage of the age 
group in question which is finally dealt with by the 
Juvenile Courts is much lower than in other states. 18 
In 1968 the Juvenile Courts disposed of 2,705 cases 
transferred from the adult courts. (The Juvenile Courts 
dispose of eight to ten thousand cases of juveniles under 
age 16 each year). During the period from January I to 
June 30, 1968, out of 2,455 criminal cases involving 16 
and 17 year olds which were handled by the Circuit 
Courts, 1,095 were transferred to the Juvenile Courts. 
The most frequent offenses transferred were breach of 
peace (298), breaking and entering with criminal intent 
(131 ), theft of goods exposed for sale (98), theft (96), 
intocication (77), and using motor vehicle without per-
mission (87). No homicides were transferred, but two 
cases of statutory rape were, as were four cases of 
robbery with violence and two cases of holdup. One 
hundred eighteen cases were bound over from the Circuit 
Court to the Superior Court. 19 In addition to the 2,455 
criminal cases handled by the Circuit Courts in this 
period, there were 2,618 traffic offenses, only 63 of 
which were transferred to the Juvenile Courts. 
Juvenile Court judges may assign any youth adjudged 
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delinquent to judicial probation, grant him a dismissal 
with warning and non-judicial supervision or commit 
him to the Department of Children and Youth Services. 
The maximum permissible commitment to the Depart-
ment is two years ( extendable for another two years). 20 
The Department may commit a 16 or 17 year old who 
has been referred to it to the Connecticut School for 
Boys at Meriden or the Long Lane School for Girls. 
The Department is currently trying to develop other 
options. 
A youth who is not transferred to the Juvenile Court 
and whose sentence is not suspended will be placed in 
the custody of the Department of Corrections with 
either a "straight" sentence with a fixed term or a so-
c ailed "indeterminate" sentence with a fixed maximum 
only. In the case of misdemeanors the maximum term 
allowable is two years with a parole hearing uniformly 
granted at nine months. The 1969 revisions to the 
Criminal Code which will become effective in 1971 
specify that one year is the maximum sentence allowable 
for misdemeanors. In the case of indeterminate sentence 
felonies the maximum allowable sentence is five years 
with parole hearings uniformly granted at 1 S months. 
The timing of these parole hearings is apparently the 
result of department practice, not statute. Those serving 
jail sentences ranging in duration from 20 days to one 
year are not eligible for parole but can earn so-called 
"good time" which automatically accrues in the absence 
of disciplinary infractions at the rate of five days per 
thirty of sentence (thus, a one-year sentence may be 
reduced with good time by S days each month. After 10 
months, a one year sentence may be reduced by SO 
days). We were assured by officials of the Department of 
Corrections that departmental practice requires that 
disciplinary infractions resulting in the failure to 
accumulate good time can be imposed only under the 
direction of the Commissioner of the Department of 
Corrections. 
The timing of the granting of parole is affected by 
two principal considerations. First, the purpose of parole 
is to allow an offender to return to society relatively 
quickly in order to minimize the psychic and social iso-
lation which imprisonment produces. During the parole 
period an offender should be given support of a type 
which will enable him to adjust more successfully than 
before. This theory of supported re-entry into society is 
implemented by early releases from confinement and 
relatively long parole periods. The second factor affect-
ing releases to parole is the severe under-staffing of the 
Parole Bureau. Currently manned only on a part-time 
basis, it can administer its caseload only by treating all 
uniformly, despite the strong arguments in this area for 
consideration of each case on its individual merits. 
All male offenders between the ages of 16 and 20 
sentenced by adult courts are sent either to the Connect-
icut Correctional Institute in Cheshire (a reformatory) or 
to the Portland Camp (forestry, minimum security 
institution). Any youngster sent to Portland must have a 
sentence of not longer than 90 days and a record free of 
drug dependency, violent crimes and prior escapes. 
In one to three per cent of the cases of 16 and 17 
year olds committed to the Department of Corrections, 
a prison sentence of 10 to 1 S years has been levied. Even 
in these cases the Department of Corrections sends the 
youthful offender to the reformatory until'he reaches 
majority, at which time he is transferred to prison. Up to 
now no 17 or 18 year old has ever been transferred from 
the custody of the Department of Corrections to that of 
the Department of Children and Youth Services, al-
though in the case of a very immatu're youth such trans-
fer might conceivably be ordered. 
Young women fare less well than men. All female 
offenders, regardless of age, offense, or length of sen-
tence are sent to the Connecticut Correctional Institute 
in Niantic, which serves as a combination jail, reforma-
tory and prison. Within this institution there is no segre-
gation of the 16 to 20 year old age group from the older 
population, nor is there any appreciable age distinction 
in the range of activities permitted. 
Questions of Policy 
Considering the high crime rate among persons 
between the ages of 16 and 25,21 together with the dif-
ferent rates of maturation among different people, it is 
not surprising that the law places 16 and 17 year olds in 
a limbo status with one foot in the juvenile system and 
the other in the adult. Drawing the age line on the assign-
ment of youths to courts is bound to be a somewhat 
arbitrary process, as the President's Task Force Report 
points out.22 But the Report opposes reducing the maxi-
mum age jurisdiction of Juvenile Courts from 18 to 16, 
noting that the commission of heinous crimes by 16 or 
17 year olds is "relatively rare and often involves mental 
disturbance or some other ground for a totally different 
disposition"23 than criminal conviction. Despite the 
position of the Task Force, one commission of the 
Connecticut legislature (the Coles Commission) recently 
rejected a proposal to extend the original and exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Courts to the age of 18. The 
Commission, which included among its 11 members two 
judges of the Juvenile Courts and two from the Circuit 
Courts, said it "heard no convincing, logical reason" to 
extend the jurisdiction. The report cited testimony by 
officials of the Connecticut School for Boys and Long 
Lane School for Girls which recognized the need for 
rehabilitative treatment but opposed an approach which 
would commit 16 and 17 year olds to institutions 
housing younger offenders. The report also noted that 
the Juvenile Court "is overburdened with transfers from 
the Circuit Court, constituting one-quarter of the total 
number of referrals."24 
One Juvenile Court judge who approved of limiting 
the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court to those not having 
reached their 16th birthday stated the following to us in 
a letter: 
"I would like the juvenile jurisdiction to cut off at 16 
but only if some kind of special procedure were made 
available for minor first offenders between the ages of 
16 and 21 (or 25) to prevent the acquisition of a per-
manent criminal record. Children under 16 have certain 
characteristics in common: 
a) Prohibited by law from most gainful employment 
(General Statutes Section 31-3 (a)) 4
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b) Required by law to attend school. 
c) Required by law to live within the control of a 
parent or guardian. 
d) Most child guidance clinics and medical facilities 
draw a line at 16 for the treatment of young people as 
'children'. 
At 16 a child may quit school, go to work, live apart 
from his parents and seek medical or psychiatric help on 
his own in adult facilities. While still a minor and dis-
abled from the exercise of other rights (voting, marriage, 
making contracts, etc.) more doors open for the first 
time at 16 than at 21. For this reason 16 (or possibly 17 
for purposes of transition) seems a logical cut-off age for 
this court. .. .I hope you and the Commission will 
deliver. .. a sound Youthful Offender Act and an end to 
the present unfortunate transfer provision." 
Another Juvenile Court judge with similar views 
noted that the juvenile system's facilities for treating the 
older offenders are inadequate and with that group one gets 
into the whole problem of youngsters who are no longer 
required to attend school and who may drive .. .I think 
this would dilute the whole thrust and efficacy of the 
special handling of juveniles by a specialized court. We 
would also not have the help of parental authority in 
dealing with these youngsters since they may, under our 
law, leave home at 16. 
On the other hand, the Subcommittee on Juvenile 
Delinquency of the Governor's Commission on Criminal 
Justice recently recommended that the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the Juvenile Courts be raised to include 16 year 
olds. That subcommittee was chaired by the chief judge 
of the Juvenile Courts. Our view is that except where the 
security interests of society necessitate transfer, the 
Juvenile Courts should have jurisdiction of 16 and 17 
year olds. We feel that in this critical age group an 
emphasis should be placed on rehabilitation and the 
avoidance of the criminal record. If the lack of parental 
support is a problem with the 16 and 17 year olds, this 
simply makes the duty of the state to provide rehabilita-
tive facilities that much more clear. 
In Connecticut the 16 or 17 year old defendant is 
brought first to the adult court and may be transferred 
to the Juvenile Court. In most states the process works 
in the opposite direction. It would apparently be impos-
sible to reverse the process in Connecticut without a 
change in the juvenile system (which currently reports 
that it is overburdened, and has only six judges). The 
Connecticut approach has been criticized by the 
President's Task Force: 
"It is undesirable for the Uurisdictional] decision to 
be made by the prosecutor or adult court judge, who is 
less likely to be familiar with institutions and other 
treatment resources and less accustomed to concen-
trating on the individual aspects of a given case."25 
There are those who oppose the transfer p{ocedure 
altogether and who would extend Juvenile Court 
jurisdiction to age 18 or 21. The author of one article in 
this vein attributes the existence of the transfer statutes 
to the need to satisfy retributive and scapegoat demands 
of communities not willing to accept blame for their 
own failure vis-a-vis youth.26 Another law review article 
on the matter notes that reasons in conflict with the 
philosophy of the Juvenile Court system may lie behind 
the transfer statutes-outrage of the community, lack of 
facilities, financial position of parents who cannot afford 
private commitment.27 Yet the same authors note that a 
safety valve is probably necessary with regard to the 
chronic offender.28 Another commentator concludes 
that the real reason behind the transfer statutes is the 
fear of giving liberty at age 21 to dangerous criminals.29 
It is by no means clear that the criteria used for trans-
fer in the various states are logical or appropriate. For 
example, home environment is an item frequently con-
sidered, and yet it has been noted that most delinquents 
are not from broken homes. 3° Consideration of the 
seriousness of the offense has been defended on the 
ground that adult courts are responsible for the security 
of society and must retain authority in that area. 31 But 
this viewpoint has been opposed by the argument that: 
It would be more consistent with the purposes of a 
juvenile code if waiver were based on findings about the 
child rather than findings about the offense. The amen-
ability of the child to rehabilitation should be more 
important than the heinousness of the offense.32 
Similar objection may be raised against an emphasis on 
past record: "What is convenient for the local authorities 
is not necessarily best for the child."33 
Accepting the need for waiver as a necessary evil, two 
prime authorities suggest criteria to be used: The 
President's Task Force recommended that a youth older 
than 16 not be transferred to adult court unless it is 
found that he is accused of at least a felony, that his 
prior record shows repeated serious offenses and that his 
treatment record is discouraging. 34 The National Council 
on Crime and Delinquency recommended that factors 
considered should include the background and character 
of the youth, the viciousness or violent nature of the 
offense and the comparative capabilities of available 
facilities of the adult and juvenile systems. 
Recommendations 
We recommend changes in the Connecticut statutes 
which will make the Juvenile Court the court of first 
instance for sixteen and seventeen year olds accused of 
crime and which will require a full investigation of the 
background of the youth and a full hearing (following 
the Kent case) before transfer can be made to the adult 
courts. We also recommend a series of specific criteria be 
applied by the court in deciding whether to transfer. 
Investigation, hearing ·and specific findings should 
eliminate the arbitrary element which inheres in the 
current Connecticut procedure. As to the criteria for 
transfers, our recommendations are an effort to strike a 
careful balance between the rehabilitative ideal of the 
Juvenile Courts and the security interests of society. 
Under the proposed criteria, the case of a 16 or 17 year 
old would be adjudicated in the Juvenile Court, unless 
findings were made that (1) the youth has committed an 
offense which makes him a grave danger to the com-
munity (such as an offense against the person or one 
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committed in an aggressive manner) and for which an 
adult court could sentence him for a period ex tending 
past his minority, (2) the youth is likely to be unamen-
able to rehabilitative treatment (such finding to be made 
primarily on the basis of a discouraging treatment 
record combined with repeated serious offenders). 
These provisions allow for the legislative judgment that 
those convicted of certain crimes may, in the interests of 
society, need to be incarcerated for a length of time 
which the ordinary juvenile system does not allow. But 
the criteria insure that if it is not the case that the in-
dividual is accused of an offense for which he could be 
incarcerated past his minority, the fact that an individual 
is dangerous ghould not, by itself, be sufficient to sup-
port jurisdiction in the adult court. We suggest that the 
burden should be placed upon the state to provide 
separate facilities to keep such youths separated from 
less aggressive offenders. The state should not be per-
mitted to take lightly the matter of giving a youth a 
criminal record, nor should it cease giving priority to 
rehabilitation until the security interests of society are 
overriding. The recommended criteria for transfer draw 
on the proposals of the President's Task Force and the 
National Council on Crime and Delinquency, and 
statutes of other states.35 
As this article goes to print, the legislature in Con-
necticut is considering a bill which, if well drawn and 
well administered, would be a valid alternative to the 
approach suggested in this article: the proposed "Youth-
ful Offender" statute. It would also have to be accom-
panied by improvements in staff and facilities if the 
reform is to be more than nominal. 
Whatever decision Connecticut eventually makes, a 
similar situation will still exist in many states through-
out the nation. The general policy considerations which 
are discussed here must be considered by any state 
interested in reform of its treatment of young offenders. 
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